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Introduction, aims and objectives 
The Dialogical Self sees the self as a dialogical narrator with others in the 
self-structure (Hermans et al., 1992). It argues that I can move between multiple 
positions and these I in different positions interact with and have conversations with 
each other (Hermans, 2002). This paper argues for the therapeutic function of a 
monologue within the self-structure. Drawing on the author’s experience of working 
through a childhood trauma through an internal monologue that is addressed to an 
imaginary other after sandplay sessions, this paper explores the value of an other in 
the self that listens to, receives and witnesses the monological telling without active 
responses. This paper argues that the monological telling to instead of talking with 
gives space to the realm of human experience that is less coherent, inarticulate and 
fragmented. It gives this realm of experience a chance to be known without imposing 




As a part of my doctoral thesis which examines the role of narrative 
in/coherence in counselling and psychotherapy, I engaged in six weeks of sandplay 
sessions as the ‘player’. Each week, with the accompany of a play therapist, I 
constructed worlds in the sand using various objects including miniatures, stones, 
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shells and so forth - it is believed that the sand world constructed is the external 
representation of one’s internal world. In those six weeks of sandplay, a shell 
repetitively appeared in my sand worlds which I named the ‘scarred shell’. It had 
evoked strong emotions in me that I did not understand.  
Weeks after I completed my sandplay sessions, an event led me to reconnect 
to a childhood trauma that I had for long not recognised as a major trauma in my life. 
Although I always remembered it, I did not recognise its major impact on my life even 
after speaking about it with a therapist. Recognising this childhood trauma allows me 
to connect to the scarred shell appeared in my sandplay. While I saw the scarred 
shall as an ‘it’ then, I now see it as ‘me’. Now, I can see and own these scars as 
mine. The scar shell is wounded and frightened, so is my body. The scarred shell 
struggles to feel safe. The protection and help offered never feel right or adequate.  
At the time when the childhood trauma happened, I was not protected as a child and 
did not know where to seek help. Just like the scarred shell, the wounded child within 
me wants to hide.  
When I first recognised what happened in my childhood as a traumatic 
experience, I was by myself reflecting on the specific event that reconnected me with 
the trauma. My realisation started with this sentence in my head ‘my body was hurt’. 
Then I went on: ‘it wanted to be close to people, but it was so scared…’ Naturally 
and unintentionally, I started to engage in an imaginary telling to a person who was 
involved in the event that led to my realisation. My realisation and recognition of the 
trauma unfolded in the telling. For the first time, I listened closely to and cried for my 
hurt body. In the midst of the intense realisation that inevitably brought pain, the 
imaginary telling became a therapeutic means for me.  
Initially, I had felt a strong sense of longing to talk to and be known by this 
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person. I rehearsed in my mind what I wanted to tell him. I imagined telling him about 
how my body felt, how it was not heard and how it had been affecting my 
relationships with others. In the telling, I processed my past experience, which then 
allowed me to understand and accept them. When I saw this person in reality, for 
various reasons, I did not tell him anything. However, in the following few weeks, I 
continued to engage in my imaginary telling. I told him again and again about myself. 
I imagined that I shared the picture of the scarred shell with him and told him about 
the scars of mine. Unexpectedly, this imaginary telling became a substitute for 
personal therapy. After few weeks of these repetitive imaginary telling, when I was 
offered a place in a counselling agency which I contacted when I first started to 
process the trauma, I did not feel the need to talk with a therapist anymore. 
In reality, I was by myself in this process. Perhaps I needed to be alone. 
However, there is no doubt that I needed to tell someone. I use the word ‘telling’ here 
because I notice that it was never an imaginative dialogue between two people. I 
imagined the content of my speech and the physical environment in which the telling 
took place, but little about this person’s responses. What was important to me was 
the act of telling and perhaps being received by the imaginary other. Maybe I did not 
want, or even rejected, a response.  
This experience of imaginary telling reminds me of my sandplay. In my 
sandplay, I often saw touching the sand as a kind of telling: telling that does not need 
words. The sand is simply being there. As I wrote at the time, ‘[I]t does not reach out 
to me. It does not offer extended arms. It is receptive without being destroyed, 
intimidated, or scared by my feelings. It allows, receives, and accepts’.  
This telling to an imaginary other draws connection to the theory of the 
dialogical self which sees the self as a dialogical narrator with others in the self-
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structure (Hermans et al., 1992). Bakhtin’s polyphonic novel is one of the central 
notions from which the theory of the dialogical self is developed (Angus & McLeod, 
2004; Hermans et al., 1992). A central characteristic of polyphonic novel, as 
discussed in Bakhtin’s (1984) examination of Dostoevsky’s novel, is the plurality of 
independent voices and consciousness that each has its own world and are 
unmerged with each other in the unity of the event. In other words, there is no single 
author or narrator in a single objective world, but multiple voices with their own 
independent views. Similarly, in the theory of the dialogical self, self is regarded as 
not a unified one, but a ‘society of mind’ (Hermans, 2002; Hermans & Dimaggio, 
2004). It is argued in the dialogical self that I can move between multiple even 
opposite positions (Hermans, 2002). These I-positions are relatively autonomous 
and each of them has their own stories to tell regarding their experience from their 
own stances (Hermans, 2002; Hermans, 2004). These different voices interact with 
each other and engage in a process of questioning and answering, agreeing and 
disagreeing (Hermans, 2002). And these voices are qualitatively different (Hermans, 
2004). As often described in literature about the dialogical self (Hermans, 2002; 
Hermans, 2004; Hermans et al., 1992), these voices are similar to characters in a 
story who exchange information about their respective Mes, which results in a 
complex self.  
One of the central notions in the dialogical self is addressivity (Hermans, 
2011). Hermans (2011) suggests that as in external dialogue with real people, 
different selves address each other in their interchange with each other. They talk 
with each other. Different Is, as subject, talk and respond to each other from their 
own positions; they talk about themselves which is the Mes, as object. These 
interchanges, as external conversation with others in daily life, can change the 
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selves’ view on themselves (Hermans, 2011).  
Addressivity is at the centre of my experience written above. There was a 
need to tell someone about it. Imaginarily telling it to a person served me 
therapeutically. However, instead of talking with, which indicates a two-way dialogue, 
I talked to the person in imagination. It is suggested that in psychotherapy when 
telling their stories, the client also listens to their stories through the therapist’s 
empathic reflections (Angus & McLeod, 2004). In my imaginary telling, I was listening 
to myself and my wound again and again, not through the response of another but 
simply through the telling. Therefore, instead of a dialogue, what I needed seemed to 
be a monologue that was received or witnessed by another. Similarly, I sometimes 
wrote letters to the figures in my sand worlds including the scarred shell. Most of the 
time I did not have imaginary two-way conversations with them. Sometimes before 
my personal therapy sessions, I would rehearse in my mind what I would like to say 
to my therapist, but when I said it out loud, it felt different from my monological 
‘rehearsal’. The actual speech often did not feel satisfactory. In my monological 
telling, I told an imaginary other about myself in the way I needed – I might say 
something repeatedly, disregard the chronological order, or restart and reorganise 
my telling at any point.  
In the theory of the dialogical self, self is seen as social: positions in the multi-
voiced self are occupied by others (Hermans, 2004). The I takes another person as a 
position that I can occupy, which offers an alternative perspective regarding the world 
and the Me (ibid). My experience resonates with the dialogical self in the crucial 
place of an other in the self. I seem to need an other even when I am not engaging in 
actual conversations. However, instead of moving between various I positions and 
engaging in an exchange among these positions, I seem to need an other to allow 
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me to further immerse into the place I am at and be the person I experience myself 
as at those particular moments. For me, this other, whether it is an imaginary person, 
sand, or figures in my sand world, is the ‘alter ego’, is ‘another I’ (Hermans, 2004:21). 
However, instead of speaking from their own perspectives, they act as an other that 
is being there and receiving my perspective without speaking their own. On one 
hand, my need for an other resonates with the concept of self as dialogical. On the 
other hand, there is a central role of a monologue that is being received yet not 
actively responded to, which I relate to the obligation to others in narrative. 
Narrative is an act of externalising and publishing oneself. Narrating, similar to 
Foucault’s view on confession as elaborated by Butler (2005), is an act of publishing 
oneself in words which makes one appear for another. The performative act of 
becoming this externalised and publicised self entails loss. As Butler’s (2005:114) 
elaboration of Foucault suggests, it requires one to give oneself over to the 
‘publicized mode of appearance’. In other words, one needs to move out of the 
solitude of oneself to become a self that is situated in the public and social relation. 
The loss involved here is the inwardness that is pre-constituted. This moving out of 
and publicising oneself, as well as the loss involved, are necessary for the 
interpersonal connection, as interpersonal relationship is always situated socially. An 
account of oneself is always addressed to another and it always takes place in the 
normative structure (Butler, 2005). My monological telling that refuses an active 
response from an internal other seem to be a resistance to the loss of the solitary 
self. I place the I and the Me that this I experiences in the absolute centre which 
cannot be obtained in a narrative that is given to an active other.  
The resonance among the theory of the dialogical self, Foucault’s, and 
Butler’s philosophy is the place of the other in the ontological constitution of the self 
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and one’s relation to oneself. The dialogical self sees the self as social with the other 
inside the self’s construction (Hermans et al., 1992). Foucault, according to Butler 
(2005), sees one’s relation to oneself as social and public. Butler (2005) sees the 
ontological constitution of the self as inherently relational: self emerges in being 
addressed by and addressing to others within context that is out of one’s control or 
not of one’s choice. 
My monological telling can be understood as an expression of the co-
existence of the need to be known and to preserve the solitary self. As Winnicott 
(2016:439) writes when he talks about the dynamic between our private self that is 
not communicating and at the same time wants to communicate and to be known: ‘It 
is a sophisticated game of hide-and-seek in which it is joy to be hidden but disaster 
not to be found’.  
Conclusion 
Although dialogue is at the centre of the dialogical self theory, in this paper, I 
argue that an internal and relational monological telling in the self-structure gives 
space to the realm of human experience that is less coherent, inarticulate and 
fragmented. It gives this realm of experience a chance to be known without imposing 
on it a narrative structure which it lacks. 
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